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THESIS ABSTRACT 
Natalie A. Nax 
Master of Science 
Conflict and Dispute Resolution Program 
June 2016 
Title: Looking to the Future: The Indus Waters Treaty and Climate Change 
 This thesis aims to challenge the Indus Waters Treaty. The Treaty remains as the 
governing authority, however there are areas in which it could be improved. One of these 
areas is how the Treaty will respond to climate change. I argue that due to changing 
environmental conditions, what made the Treaty so successful in the past will no longer 
be relevant in the future. This argument is supported by relevant literature reviews of 
journals and reports done by policy analysts, academics, and water management experts. 
Additionally, I address the need to mitigate for climate change by explaining the 
consequences climate change will have on the ecosystem and infrastructure of India and 
Pakistan. Finally, I examine case studies and make suggestions about the changes that 
can be made in order to create a Treaty that successfully mitigates for climate change.  
 
  
v	  	  	  	  
	  
CURRICULUM VITAE 
NAME OF AUTHOR: Natalie A. Nax 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 University or Oregon, Eugene 
 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
 Master of Science, Conflict and Dispute Resolution, 2016, University of Oregon 
 Bachelor of Science, Environmental Studies, 2014, University of Oregon 
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
 Environmental Conflict Resolution 
 Collaborative Governance 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
Intern, Center for Collaborative Planning at California State University, 
Sacramento, Sacramento, California, 2016 
  
vi	  	  	  	  
	  
TABLE	  OF	  CONTENTS	  Chapter	   Page	  	  	  I.	  THE	  INDUS	  WATERS	  TREATY	  .................................................................................................	  	   1	  	   Historical	  Background	  .............................................................................................................	  	   1	  	   The	  Agreement	  ...........................................................................................................................	  	   3	  	  	   Profile	  of	  the	  Indus	  River	  Basin	  ...........................................................................................	  	   5	  	  II.	  A	  SUCCESSFUL	  TREATY	  ............................................................................................................	  	   7	  III.	  THE	  CHALLENGES	  OF	  THE	  IWT	  	  .........................................................................................	  	   10	  	   Consequences	  of	  Downstream	  Flow	  .................................................................................	  	   10	  	   Consequences	  of	  Dispute	  Resolution	  ................................................................................	  	   11	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Consequences	  of	  Population	  Growth	  .................................................................................	  	   12	  	   Consequences	  of	  Simplified	  Management	  ......................................................................	  	   12	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Consequences	  of	  Climate	  Change	  ........................................................................................	  	   13	  IV.	  WHY	  SHOULD	  INDIA	  AND	  PAKISTAN	  BE	  CONCERNED	  ABOUT	  CLIMATE	  CHANGE?	  ..............................................................................................................................................	  	   15	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Climate	  Change	  will	  Reduce	  Water	  Availability	  ...........................................................	  	   15	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Climate	  Change	  will	  Affect	  Agriculture	  Production	  ....................................................	  	   16	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Climate	  Change	  will	  Affect	  Hydrologic	  Cycle	  .................................................................	  	   17	  	   Climate	  Change	  will	  Increase	  Environmental	  Scarcity	  ..............................................	  	   18	  V.	  MODIFYING	  THE	  IWT	  TO	  ADAPT	  TO	  CLIMATE	  CHANGE	  ..........................................	  	   20	  	   What	  Does	  a	  Successful	  Treaty	  Look	  Like?	  ....................................................................	  	   20	  	   Flexible	  Allocations	  ...................................................................................................................	  	   20	  	  	   Drought	  Provisions	  ...................................................................................................................	  	   21	  	  
vii	  	  	  	  
	  
Chapter	   Page	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Review	  Procedures	  and	  Joint	  Management	  ....................................................................	  	   21	  	   Making	  a	  Successful	  Treaty	  a	  Reality	  ................................................................................	  	   21	  	  	   Including	  Other	  Players	  ..........................................................................................................	  	   23	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Decision-­‐Making	  .........................................................................................................................	  	   23	  	  	  VI.	  IMPROVING	  UPON	  THE	  INDUS	  COMMISSION	  ...............................................................	  	   27	  	   Establishing	  the	  Commission	  as	  a	  Method	  of	  Facilitation	  .......................................	  	   27	  	   Commission	  Members	  as	  Facilitators	  	  ..............................................................................	  	   28	  	  	   Commission	  Members	  as	  Experts	  ......................................................................................	  	   29	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Commission	  Members	  as	  Interpreters	  and	  Decision	  Makers	  .................................	  	   30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Examples	  of	  Successful	  Facilitations	  	  .................................................................................	  	   31	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Case	  Study	  example:	  Zambezi	  River	  in	  Africa	  ................................................................	  	   31	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Case	  Study	  example:	  Niger	  River	  in	  West	  Africa	  ..........................................................	  	   33	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Case	  Study	  example:	  Mekong	  River	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  ...............................................	  	   34	  	  VII.	  REALITY	  CHECKING	  AND	  CONCLUSION	  ........................................................................	  	   37	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  A	  Good	  Foundation	  ....................................................................................................................	  	   37	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Feasibility	  .......................................................................................................................................	  	   37	  	  	   Conclusion	  ....................................................................................................................................	  	   39	  	  REFERENCES	  CITED	  ........................................................................................................................	  	   42	  
viii	  	  	  	  
	  
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure                                                                                                                             Page 
  I.	  The	  Indus	  River	  Basin	  and	  its	  rivers	  .....................................................................................	  	   7	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1	  	  	   	  
CHAPTER I 
THE INDUS WATERS TREATY 
Historical Background 
The conflict between India and Pakistan started long before the departure of 
British colonial rule from the Indian subcontinent, but became international after the 
partition. After the departure of the British Indian Empire, the Punjab was partitioned. 
The eastern part went to India and was to be Hindu, and the western part went to Pakistan 
and was to be Muslim (Khawaja 2012). The partition led to violent rioting as people 
found themselves on the wrong side of the religiously partitioned countries. Thus, in 
order to prevent becoming a minority in an area dominated by the other religion, an 
exodus of Hindus traveling to India and Muslims traveling to Pakistan began. The divide 
generated religious violence and killed approximately one million people. It also 
displaced around 12 million people and approximately 75,000 women were abducted and 
assaulted (Gonzalez Manchon 2000). The conflict grew as the partition cut across the 
Indus Basin separating the established irrigation systems. 
During Britain’s rule, the British Raj built a large canal network within the Indus 
Basin in southern Punjab, transforming the land of the Punjab from a desert into a one of 
the richest agricultural settlements. The canal irrigation, “transformed this region from 
desert waste, or at best pastoral savanna, to one of the major centers of commercialized 
agriculture in South Asia” (Muhammad, A 2011 citing Ali 2003). This canal irrigation 
system transformed from 3 million acres in 1885 to 14 million acres by the end of British 
rule in 1947. The agricultural vitality necessitated the need for a railway system to 
increase the production and export of goods to the United Kingdom (Khawaja 2012). 
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Thus, the mostly rural way of life in Punjab became more industrialized (Muhammad, A 
2011. citing Ali 2003) which greatly improved the socio-economic state of the Punjab. 
However, conflict escalated in the early 1900s when the Muslim League in the 
Indian Congress began advocating for Indian self-government. The Hindu majority 
leaders did not agree and the Muslim-Hindu relationship began to disintegrate. In 1935, 
the Government of India Act approved the Indian self-government and put water under 
provincial jurisdiction. The Punjab proposed extensive development along the Sind 
border and the Sind appointed a commission to study the Sind’s concern. The judicial 
Commission called for integrated management but its report was found unsatisfactory by 
both the Sind and the Punjab. A draft agreement was produced, but again, neither of the 
provinces accepted the terms and conditions. It was referred to London for final decision 
in 1947 (Wolf & Newton n.d.). However, before the final decision was made, the British 
Indian Empire partitioned the subcontinent into the Union of India and the Dominion of 
Pakistan in August 1947.  
Consequently, the Indus Basin and its cherished canal system were now divided 
between two states. The geographical split dictated Pakistan as the lower riparian state 
and the flow of water into Pakistan was now dependent on India. To protect the flow of 
water, the Chief Engineers of East and West Punjab signed an agreement on December 
20, 1947 known as the Standstill Agreement. This agreement “bound India to allow pre-
partition allocation of water in the basin up to March 31, 1948” (Ahmad 2011; Wolf & 
Newton n.d.). India asserted that Pakistan could not claim any share of water “as a matter 
of right” (Wolf & Newton n.d.) and its position was reinforced by Pakistan’s agreement 
to pay for water under the Standstill Agreement. India argued that since Pakistan agreed 
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to pay for water, they recognized India’s water rights. Pakistan countered that they had 
rights of prior appropriation (Biswas 1992). The disputing claims increased the 
geopolitical hostility between the two countries. When the Standstill Agreement expired 
on April 1, 1948, India shut off partial water supplies into Pakistan affecting 8% of its 
cultivable area during sowing season. Additionally, the city of Lahore was deprived of its 
municipal water and the electricity derived from the Mandi hydroelectric scheme was 
also cut off. This, combined with the stresses or partition, triggered a decade-long water 
dispute that contributed to India and Pakistan being on the precipice of war until the 
World Bank intervened (Ahmad 2011; Wolf & Newton n.d.). The World Bank proposed 
water sharing agreements “based on three principles: (1) water in the Indus Basin is 
sufficient to meet the needs of both countries; (2) all tributaries in the Indus Basin should 
be included in the discussion and (3) the negotiations should focus on technical rather 
than political issues” (Yang et al. 2014). These agreements led to the ratification of the 
Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 (Alam 2002). 
The Agreement 
The Preamble of the Indus Waters Treaty recognizes the need for “fixing and 
delimiting in a spirit of goodwill and friendship, the rights and obligations of each in 
relation to the other concerning the use of these waters” (Jawed 1966). Both countries 
“had recognised their common interest in optimum development of the rivers and 
declared their intention to co-operate by mutual agreement” (Warikoo 2005). Explicitly, 
the goals of the Treaty were to divide the ownership of the waterways of the Indus Basin 
between India and Pakistan (Iyer 2005) and regulate the construction of storage works 
and catchment areas (Jawed 1996). 
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The Treaty allocated the water from the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and 
Sutlej) to India and the water from the three western rivers (Jhelum, Chenab, and Indus) 
to Pakistan, and established regulations for each country. The Treaty laid out the 
regulations as such:  
• Except for domestic and non-consumptive use, all Eastern Rivers “shall be 
unrestrictedly available to India” after the transition period. Once the 
rivers have crossed into Pakistan, then Pakistan has unrestricted use.  
• India shall not “store any water or construct any storage works on the 
Western Rivers” and shall not interfere with the Western Rivers. 
• “Pakistan, should it want to increase the catchment area, shall increase the 
capacity of that drainage to the extant necessary so as not to impart its 
efficacy for dealing with drainage waters received from India”  
• If “India finds drainages should be deepened or widened in Pakistan, 
Pakistan agrees to undertake to do so as long as India agrees to pay the 
cost of deepening or widening”  (Indus Waters Treaty 1960).  
Non-consumptive use and domestic use shall be permitted “in both rivers by both 
countries, but such use should not in any way affect the flow of rivers or channels, to be 
used by the other party” (Warikoo 2005). Because the Treaty divided the water from the 
western and eastern rivers in an effort to maintain India and Pakistan’s independence 
from one another, the implications of this meant that each country had the opportunity to 
develop individually. Long-term development and the regulation of storage and 
catchment areas support an increase in water flow for irrigation and agriculture.  
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Additionally, India and Pakistan agreed to each establish a Permanent Indus 
Commission, made up of one Commissioner from each country, and to appoint an 
engineer in hydrology and water-use. The commission serves as a channel of 
communication and monitors the actions and interprets the Treaty. An inspection would 
be held every 5 years and the Commission should meet at least once a year alternating 
between India and Pakistan, with the agreement to monitor each other; promote 
cooperative arrangements for the treaty implementation; promote cooperation in the 
development of waters; examine and resolve any dispute pertaining to the interpretation 
and implementation of the treaty; and submit an annual report to the two governments 
(Indus Waters Treaty 1960; Wolf & Newton n.d.). Finally, the Treaty called for a method 
of dispute resolution over the interpretation about the intention of the Treaty. The method 
agreed upon is mediation through a third party and then arbitration through the Indus 
Commission (Iyer 2002) if mediation fails and both parties agree to proceed.  
Profile of the Indus River Basin 
The Indus River begins in the Tibetan Plateau in China. The climate of the upper 
basin is dominated by air masses that contribute to the snowfall on the glaciers whose 
melt define the hydrologic regime of the Indus. The Indus River then descends into 
Gilgit, Swat, and the Northwest Frontier Province. Before the river reaches the plains of 
the Indus River Basin, it is impounded behind Pakistan’s Tarbela dam. The 5 tributaries 
originate from the Hindu Kush, Karakorum, and Himalayan glacial mountain ranges (see 
figure 1). About 50-80% of the total average river flows in Pakistan are fed by snow and 
glacial melt, with the remaining coming from Monsoon rain (Yu et al. 2013). The Beas, 
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Sutlej, and Ravi rivers carry heavy monsoon flow while the Chenab River is transitional. 
The Jhelum River has no monsoon flow (Wescoat Jr., 1991).   
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Indus River Basin and its rivers. 
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CHAPTER II 
A SUCCESSFUL TREATY 
The Indus Waters Treaty exemplifies a successful mediation because it brought 
two antagonistic countries to a resolution. Without the Treaty, it is likely that India and 
Pakistan would have experienced greater conflict over the past 60 years. For example, 
conflicts surrounding poverty, infectious diseases, and environmental degradation are 
factors that, when combined with other factors such as social and political unrest, can 
escalate to war. The United Nations Environment Programme determined that “since 
1990, at least 18 violent conflicts have been fueled by the exploitation of natural 
resources” (UNEP 2015). Additionally, Ken Conca and Geoffrey Dabelko highlight the 
large amount of research suggesting that scarcity of resources, like water, could 
contribute to “social instability and violent conflict” (UNEP 2015). Often times, conflicts 
over resources escalate into something greater. In the case of India and Pakistan, the 
resolution surrounding the Indus Basin came early and helped the parties avoid violent 
conflicts, earning it praise from mediation professionals. 
Prior to the creation of the Indus Waters Treaty, the World Bank concluded that 
“not only was the stalemate likely to continue, but the ideal goal of integrated watershed 
development for the benefit of both riparians was probably too elusive of a goal at this 
stage of political relations” (Wolf & Newton n.d.). Yet, considering the animosity of the 
two countries, “it was, perhaps, the closest possible realistic solution” (Ahmad 2011). 
The fact that the Treaty was able to come into existence despite the odds against it is a 
feat in itself. The Treaty has remained the governing rule for the past six decades, and 
despite the numerous conflicts and two all-out wars between India and Pakistan that have 
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occurred since 1960 (India and Pakistan: Troubled relations n.d.), the Treaty has 
successfully prevented violent conflict over water. Zawahri (2009) credits a large success 
of the Treaty to the implementation of the joint commission and conflict resolution, as it 
supported stable cooperation between the parties (DeStefano et al 2012). The 
Commission has successfully helped negotiate, monitor, and manage the two parties.  
The Indus Waters Treaty allowed each country to become independent of the 
other regarding the operation of its water supplies, particularly important given the 
antagonistic relationship between the two states in other domains. It made each country 
responsible for planning, constructing, and managing its own interests and operations 
within its own territory. “The independence afforded by the Treaty and assurances 
against the interference by either country reduced chances of disputes and tension” 
(Ahmad 2011). The states were given a type of free will to manage their water in ways 
that benefitted their own interest, allowing them to make full use of their water.  
The Treaty also maintained the commercial development of the British Raj, with 
the goal to increase irrigation and improve agriculture. India had received three rivers and 
was able to construct a reservoir on the Beas River. This reservoir provided the water that 
was used to irrigate the desert of Rajasthan. (Jawed 1966). It was due to the conditions 
laid out in the Indus Waters Treaty that India was able to construct this reservoir without 
interference from Pakistan. Without the Treaty, India’s part of the desert would have 
remained largely not irrigated since the partition left most canals in Pakistan (Thar 
Desert, n.d.). This was also true for Pakistan. In 1958, two years before the Indus Waters 
Treaty, the amount of irrigated land in Pakistan was 1.18 million hectares. In 2008 this 
number had soared to 14.87 million hectares (FAO. 2015). This is a huge success for the 
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Indus Waters Treaty and especially for Pakistan since it was worried about being 
subjected to its neighbor’s good will. It is likely that if the Treaty had never taken place, 
the headwaters would have been in India’s territory and Pakistan’s claims to water would 
have been weak under the law. Irrigation is an important determinate of success because 
it illustrates an improvement in development and also provides for agricultural success. 
India and Pakistan would not have taken the time to develop in these areas if they did not 
have faith that the current allocated waters would be successful long-term. Both of them 
were able to see their Punjab regions prosper and become the respective ‘bread basket’ 
for each other because of the reliable irrigation. 
Naturally, the increase in irrigated land led to an increase in agricultural 
production. Between 1970 and 1995, crop production in Pakistan increased 39% (FAO. 
2015). This is compared to the years between 1891 and 1946 when the annual growth rate 
of all crop output was 0.4% for the entire Indian subcontinent, including what would later 
become Pakistan (Chauhan 2012). It is because of the Indus Waters Treaty that the 
increased irrigation led to an increase in agriculture for India and Pakistan.  
Overall, the Treaty provided many opportunities for development, irrigation, and 
economic expansion. Without it, it is likely that these opportunities would have been 
harder to come by, as India and Pakistan would not have the autonomy they have now. In 
addition to the economic benefits, the Treaty has also prevented conflicts over water 
rights for over 60 years. It is evident that the Treaty facilitated the development of the 
countries and provided a successful tool of water management.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE CHALLENGES OF THE IWT 
The Treaty has provided peace between the two antagonistic countries. It has 
prevented war over water for over 6 decades and has remained in authority with little 
pushback. Unfortunately, nothing is ever perfect. The Treaty does have some problems 
associated with downstream flow, dispute resolution, population growth, and 
management by bordering states (Siddiqui 2015). However, despite these consequences, 
the Indus Waters Treaty still stands strong. While these consequences may be small and 
have not shown any threat to the Treaty’s success, the unforeseen consequence of climate 
change may be the consequence that dismantles the Treaty entirely.  
Consequences of Downstream Flow 
The Treaty places India as the upstream state and Pakistan as the downstream 
state. A consequence of the down flow of water is the creation of an upstream-
downstream problem. Unfortunately, this means that, regardless of the development and 
India’s use of the waters, the water will always flow to Pakistan in diminished quality and 
quantity. The Treaty gives autonomy to each country, giving them the freedom to 
develop their nationalist agendas, as long as it does not impose on the other country. 
However, the term ‘impose’ is ambiguous and does not clarify any restrictions on water 
quality. Thus, Pakistan argues, the Treaty could potentially permit the allocation of 
polluted water into Pakistan. For example, India can “easily run Pakistan dry either by 
diverting the flow of water by building storage dams or using up all the water through 
hydroelectric power schemes” and not be in violation of the Treaty (Wheeler 2011). 
Pakistan is suffering from water scarcity and is claiming its upstream neighbors are 
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responsible for its water troubles (Wheeler 2011). Pakistan’s economy also heavily 
depends on agriculture and relies on the Indus tributaries. Pakistan fears that the upstream 
dams that India possesses enable India to manipulate the water flow (Mandhana 2012). 
The Treaty has allowed India to build dams and storage units on its rivers without the 
consultation of Pakistan because the dam does not cross over into Pakistani territory. 
However, this has severely altered the flow regime into Pakistan (Qureshi 2011); 
Pakistan claims that India’s dams have also diminished Pakistan’s control of the Chenab 
and Jhelum rivers (Miner et al. 2009). This power that India has over Pakistan irritates 
the already antagonistic relationship between the countries and contributes to the 
hostility.  
Consequences of Dispute Resolution 
The last condition of the Treaty required the formation of the Indus Commission, 
which implemented two dispute resolution processes. One was to be a resolution process 
with a neutral, third-party and the other was to be an arbitration process. For example, a 
dispute arose in 1980 about India’s plans to build the Wuller Barrage on the Jhelum 
River. Pakistan protested this claiming that it violates the Indus Waters Treaty and the 
case was sent to the Commission; however, the Commission failed to resolve the dispute 
and the project was ultimately suspended. Then in 2005, the World Bank was called to 
resolve a dispute surrounding the Baglihar hydropower project by India. The talks once 
again had failed and have yet to be resolved (Alam 2002; Wolf & Newton n.d.) The 
dispute resolution mechanism has been sufficient so far, but it is imperfect. The former 
deputy executive director of the United Nations Environment Programme, Shafqat 
Kakakhel, highlights the concerns with the dispute resolution system. While arbitration is 
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less expensive and time consuming than traditional judicial forums, it still costs 
substantial time and money. “The Indus Commission hasn’t played an effective role as 
envisaged in the Treaty. All disputes have been settled by the courts of arbitration which 
has been highly expensive for us” (Siddiqui 2015). Finally, the Indus Commission has 
not lived up to its full potential. The objective of the Commission is to build development 
on the Indus system, but “since 1960, no projects have been submitted under the 
provisions of ‘future cooperation’” (Wolf & Newton n.d.). 
Consequences of Population Growth 
Additionally, changes in population have challenged the Treaty’s effectiveness. 
“With depleting storage capacity and increasing population, Pakistan is running fast 
towards the situation of water shortage and threat of famine” (Bhatti and Farooq 2014). 
In 1960, India had to support 449.66 million people and Pakistan had to support 44.91 
million people during that same year (The World Bank 2015). However, as of 2014, 
India’s population has skyrocketed to 1.3 billion people (The World Bank 2015) and the 
increase in population puts pressure on water resources (Sarfraz 2013). “The rising 
population means per capita water availability has fallen dramatically from 5,000 M3 per 
person in 1947, to 1,080 M3 per person during 2010” (International Union for 
Conservation of Nature, Pakistan Water Apportionment Accord, 2010); and in Pakistan, 
water availability is expected to fall to as little as 800m3 per capita by 2025 (WWF 
Pakistan 2007).  
 Consequences of Simplified Management 
The Treaty monitors water management of waterways in India and Pakistan but 
does not monitor bordering states. Unfortunately, this is a simplified approach to water 
13	  	  	   	  
management. By only monitoring India and Pakistan, it overlooks the actions of other 
states within the Indus River Basin, such as China and Afghanistan. Thus, it does not put 
any restrictions on the bordering states that have access to the waterways. It also only 
covers river water and not groundwater. This is an oversight that necessitates some sort 
of cooperation and water sharing plan for the future.  
Consequences of Climate Change 
Finally, my biggest concern is that the Treaty is outdated and does not take into 
consideration the changing environment due to climate change. In its defense, climate 
change was not a prevalent topic during the time that the Indus Waters Treaty was 
enacted. However, the changing conditions of the rivers warrant a re-negotiation of the 
Treaty.  
The area of the Indus River Basin totals 1.12 million km2 and is shared among 
300 million people of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and China. Glacial melt from the 
western Himalayas contribute to more than 40% of the annual water flow within the 
Basin (South Asia Water Initiative’s Indus Focus Area Strategy: 2013-2017). However, 
predictions are that glaciers will retreat for the next 50 years increasing the flow of the 
rivers. The depletion of the glacial reserves will be followed by a 30-40% decrease in 
water flow of the River Indus, the main river of the Indus Basin tributaries. (Husain 
2010). Scientists predict that climate change will also considerably affect the average 
rainfall in the upcoming years, leading to harsher droughts or larger floods (Cooley et al 
2009; DeStefano et al. 2012). For example, Pakistan is predicted to see a decrease in 
number of rainy days but an increase in extreme precipitation events (Husain 2010). One 
of the most devastating affects of climate change is that it can reduce access to freshwater 
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and lead to conflict (DeStefano et al. 2012 citing CNA 2007: 13-16). The Treaty should 
be modified to reflect climate change because the reduction in the availability of water 
causes a domino affect in all sectors of life.  
Climate change is crossing the threshold of irreversibility, meaning that even if 
the contextual factors like the political and economic causes are resolved, climate change 
will continue to be a burden on society (Homer-Dixon 1999). Ultimately, climate change 
can drastically alter the effectiveness of a Treaty if it does not adapt to the future changes. 
It can “affect the ability of basin states to meet their water treaty commitments” when the 
treaties are not set up to react to variability (DeStefano et al 2012 citing Ansink & Ruijs, 
2008; Goulden, Conway & Persechino, 2009). Climate change may have negative effects 
that can reduce the availability of food. This will affect human and economic livelihood, 
health, and the environment’s integrity. 
It is evident that the Indus Waters Treaty is an example of a successful mediation, 
but it does not come without its faults. The unforeseen threat of climate change 
challenges the authority of the Treaty. What may have worked well in the past may not 
work in the future as climate change changes the conditions of the environment of the 
waterways. The threat of climate change warrants the need to update the Treaty to 
support these changing conditions. 
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CHAPTER IV 
WHY SHOULD INDIA AND PAKISTAN BE CONCERNED ABOUT 
CLIMATE CHANGE? 
 
Today, we associate India and Pakistan’s relationship with the dispute over the 
ownership of Kashmir. In fact, most of the violent conflicts between the two states have 
been due to the Kashmir dispute. Because this is so prevalent, conflict over water is 
probably not their highest concern. However, what makes water conflict so unique is that 
water resources are affected by environmental and anthropogenic conditions. Two large 
countries like India and Pakistan will use far more water than two smaller countries. This 
water cannot be renewed except for when it is replenished by the hydrologic cycle. 
However, climate change will greatly alter that cycle. As climate change persists, so will 
water resource conflicts. Climate change is a stressor and “although the potential for 
outright war between countries over water is low, cooperation is also often missing in 
disputes over transboundary resources” (Wolf 2007). The longer climate change concerns 
are overshadowed by the situation in Kashmir, the worse the situation will be when it is 
finally addressed.  India and Pakistan are both in a perilous position surrounding water 
availability. Both countries are facing a shortage of water and it is expected that they will 
continue to experience this. Therefore, “it would be beneficial if both countries 
recognized their cooperative potential and combined their resources and expertise to 
make mutually beneficial decisions” (Ahmad 2011).  
Climate Change will Affect the Hydrologic Cycle 
Climate change affects hydrologic events like precipitation patterns and runoff, 
which increases the vulnerability of certain regions. For example, “the volume of runoff 
from winter snowmelt will be determined primarily by variations in winter precipitation. 
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On the other hand, glacier melt water production will vary with the energy availability 
(changes in temperature, primarily during summer) during the melt season at the glacier 
surface” (Yu et al. 2013). Scientists have predicted that precipitation will decrease over 
the lower Indus Basin leading to drought-like conditions and an overall warming effect. 
While climate change predictions in this region cannot be certain, trends are predicted to 
continue toward this pattern (Rajbhandari et al. 2014; Cooley et al 2009). Extreme 
flooding in the Basin will wreck havoc on farms and communities that reside on the 
riverbanks. Flooding will transform the soil and make the surrounding areas more 
susceptible to erosion and degradation, which washes pollution into the waterways and 
decreases agricultural productivity (Cooley et al 2009). 
Climate Change Will Reduce Water Availability 
Analyses of the rate of glacial melt that feeds into the Indus Rivers Basin is 
limited due to inaccessibility of the rugged Himalayan mountains and high altitudes (Yu 
et al. 2013), but projections made by a hydrological modeling approach combined with 
glacier mass-balance calculations showed a best-guess glacial scenario result of a 
“decrease in mean upstream water supply from the upper Indus” (Immerzeel 2010). It is 
assumed that the bulk of the glacial melt into the Indus Rivers tributaries occurs in the 
ablation zone. This makes up 18% of the total flow of 110 MAF from the mountain 
headwaters of the Indus River into Pakistan. The most probable source of the remaining 
82% of flow is melt from the winter snowpack (Yu et al. 2013). In a measurement taken 
by the Normalized Melt Index (NMI) over the period of 2001 to 2007, it was discovered 
that snow and glacial melt “is 151% of the total discharge naturally generated in the 
downstream areas [of the Indus]” (Immerzeel 2010) and a recent Dutch study predicted 
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that shrinking glaciers would reduce the flows of the Indus by 8% by the year 2050 
(Mandhana 2012). This decrease in water flow is harmful because the Indus Rivers’ 
water flow acts as the primary source of water for the downstream part of the Indus Basin 
(Rajbhandari et al. 2014). Additionally, about one third of the renewable water resource 
is groundwater. The average availability is estimated at 287 km 3 , with about 1,329 m3 
available per capita. Climate change is predicted to reduce renewable water availability to 
below 750 m3 per capita by 2050 (South Asia Water Initiative’s Indus Focus Area 
Strategy: 2013-2017 citing the Indus Basin Working Group 2013). The effects in the 
Indus are likely to be severe owing to the large population of 300 million people and 
dependence on agriculture within the Indus River Basin (Immerzeel 2010).  
Climate Change Will Affect Agriculture Production 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that 
freshwater systems are more susceptible to climate change impacts as increased 
precipitation and variability is projected to increase the risk of floods and droughts, which 
will affect food stability and water infrastructure (Cooley et al 2009; DeStefano et al. 
2012). This is dangerous because Pakistan is dependent on the Indus River System and 
has no other alternatives if the Indus runs short (International Union for Conservation of 
Nature, Pakistan Water Apportionment Accord, 2010). Agriculture generates 23% of 
Pakistan’s national income and about 68% of the population living in rural areas are 
dependent on agriculture for their livelihood” (Bhatti and Farooq 2014). The Indus River 
System, which brings about 154.3 MAF of water annually (Bhatti and Farooq 2014), is a 
necessary component for irrigation and agriculture for 300 million people within the 
Indus River Basin.  
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Climate Change Will Increase Environmental Scarcity  
Environmental scarcity refers to when the availability of a resource declines or 
when quality of a resource is diminished. One of the most dangerous types of scarcity is a 
scarcity of water, considering that water is a vital resource to sustain food production.  
Environmental scarcity interacts with other factors to generate violence. For 
example, “It often acts as a deep underlying stressor of social systems, and it produces its 
effects by interacting with other contextual factors unique to the society” (Homer-Dixon 
1999).  The interactivity of the system justifies a closer analysis. In an interactive system, 
none of the causes are sufficient but all are necessary. The system is linked together so 
that not one cause can produce the event itself. Thus, it is not poor politics that cause 
violence because even great governments can experience violence; rather, it is the 
interaction of both politics and environmental crisis that lead to violence. Environmental 
scarcity indirectly affects society as it often acts as a stressor that manifests conflict into 
violence.  
India and Pakistan are also subject to greater segmentation of society existing 
along ethnic cleavage. The conflict between India and Pakistan has existed since the 
departure of the British, and scarcity will aggravate the divisions and encourage 
competition among groups. In this case, India and Pakistan now have an additional fight 
of sharing diminishing water resources. Even though they have the Treaty to help allocate 
water, diminishing resources complicates it. As water availability decreases, it is likely 
that the countries will compete with each other in order to secure the water to which they 
are both entitled. Additionally, both countries are plagued with hawkish and 
psychological biases. Each party has a tendency for suspicion and hostility to the other 
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(Kahneman and Renshon 2009), which exacerbates division and competition. Each 
country also has pre-existing perceptions of the other due to their unfortunate history. The 
countries view each other as competition and as enemies. For example, “In divided states 
where people have experienced conflict, both sides hold onto their perception of the other 
as the enemy” (Johnson 2007). Their biases toward each other create misperceptions of 
the others’ intentions and reinforce the existing conflicts. Adding the past conflict 
between India and Pakistan with the current conflict of water scarcity in the Indus Basin 
could ignite serious conflict. 
While literature (Homer-Dixon 1991; Sprout & Sprout 1957; Wolf 2007) argues 
about the likelihood of an outright war, they can agree that environmental stress does 
perpetuate violence. Ultimately, water is used for all aspects of life and its use is multi-
objective. “The chances of finding mutually acceptable solutions drop precipitously as 
more actors are involved” (Wolf 2007). The chances decrease even more so as water 
quantity decreases. Climate change will affect the amount of usable water, damaging 
agriculture, industry, and human health.  
As climate change persists, there are obvious and drastic consequences. The 
biggest consequence being that water quantity will diminish. The amount of water 
available for agriculture and livestock will decrease, the health of the water will diminish, 
and typical weather patterns will change. It is necessary to take the threats of climate 
change seriously because water is the backbone to life in India and Pakistan. The Indus 
Waters Treaty needs to be re-negotiated to accommodate for the changing conditions. It 
is likely that climate change will bring a new set of water-associated conflicts and the 
Treaty needs to be ready to mitigate for these new conflicts.  
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CHAPTER V 
MODIFYING THE IWT TO ADAPT TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
What Does a Successful Treaty Look Like? 
A successful treaty responds to potential problems. In the case of the Indus 
Waters Treaty, any changes made should mitigate for water availability, flooding, and its 
corresponding consequences. There are four categories of mechanisms that can be 
incorporated into existing treaties to make them more responsive to these issues 
associated with climate change. They are: (1) flexible allocation strategies; (2) drought 
provisions; (3) amendment and review procedures; and (4) joint management institutions 
(Cooley et al. 2009). The scope of these mechanisms can provide the flexibility needed to 
accommodate for climate change.  
Flexible Allocation 
To successfully accommodate for climate change, the Treaty needs to be resilient 
and flexible. DeStefano et al. (2012) asserts that a resilient treaty responds to two major 
factors: allocation and variability management. A treaty needs to have a mechanism in 
the agreement that stipulates water quantity because it offers some certainty in the 
uncertain future of climate change. The Indus Waters Treaty does dictate an allocation 
agreement, however, the problem is that the agreement is not sustainable for the 
increasing populations and the decreasing resource. Thus, many agree that treaties that 
“exhibit flexibility are likely to be more suitable for dealing with water variability” 
(DeStefano et al 2012 citing Drieschova, Giordano & Fischhendler, 2008; Wolf & 
Hamner, 2000). A treaty with flexible allocation mechanisms recognizes that water 
allocations may have to be reduced to match water availability (DeStefano et al. 2012 
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citing McCaffrey 2003).  
Drought Provisions 
A resilient treaty should also have a system of variability management in place. 
“Variability management stipulations are designed to deal with climatic extremes such as 
droughts and floods or other specific variations” (DeStefano et al. 2012 citing Bakker 
2006). Thus, the Treaty may respond to this similarly to how it responds to allocation. A 
treaty needs to be flexible to deal with the reduction in available water due to drought. 
Review Procedures and Joint Management 
The final two mechanisms already exist in the Indus Waters Treaty.  A successful 
Treaty needs to have a system of conflict resolution, such as third-party involvement or 
arbitration, in place to review the parties’ actions. It provides a forum for communication 
and information, which is invaluable when there are disagreements about the 
interpretation of the Treaty (DeStefano et al. 2012 citing Drieschova, Giordano & 
Fishhendler 2008). Conflict Resolution increases the level of confidence of the parties, 
ensuring that their needs will be heard in a fair environment (DeStefano et al. 2012). 
Finally, a treaty needs management institutions that facilitate the conflict and dispute 
resolution process. Joint commissions like the Indus Commission and other river basin 
organizations may contribute to the effective management of the parties (DeStefano et al 
2012).  
Making a Successful Treaty a Reality 
 As mentioned above, there are four mechanisms of resilient and responsive 
treaties. The Indus Waters Treaty already has two of the mechanisms in place, but needs 
modifications to include flexibility and variability management in order to become 
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resilient. These mechanisms also need to respond to the problems associated with the 
existing Indus Waters Treaty. 
A treaty with flexible allocation mechanisms recognizes that water allocations 
may have to be reduced to match water availability (DeStefano et al. 2012 citing 
McCaffrey 2003). It would address the disproportionate division of water and require the 
parties to re-allocate the water to accommodate for downstream flow. If the parties agree 
to this, there are arrangements that can accommodate for flow variability. A treaty may 
require that the upstream state, “ to deliver a minimum flow to a downstream riparian 
state in order to maintain human health and key ecological functions” (Cooley et al. 
2009). For example, water allocation in the Indus Basin gives India and Pakistan three 
rivers each and the allocation remains fixed. So if the water flow in one of Pakistan’s 
rivers declines dramatically, Pakistan would be left with a smaller amount of water 
available than India. However, flexible allocation would provide water based on flow 
variability; so in this case, India would have to deliver water to Pakistan to make up for 
their loss. Thus, each country would be provided for no matter the changing conditions. 
Flexible allocation ensures a fair distribution of water.  
Flexible allocation can also account for the population growth. The problem with 
the Indus Waters Treaty is, with climate change there may not be enough water to support 
the population. By amending the allocation provisions, water can be shared or re-divided 
to provide for both the large populations of India and Pakistan. The allocations should not 
be fixed and should change to fit the fluctuating availability. 
Variability management for extreme weather events caused by climate change can 
come from the allocation mechanism suggested above, tighter irrigation procedures, 
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reservoir releases, and data sharing (McCaffrey 2003; Turton 2003). In addition, treaties 
can mitigate flood issues by establishing flood-warning systems to riverbank 
communities and by creating infrastructure like floodwalls and levees (Rossi et al 1994). 
States can also create flood management teams to develop protocols that can be 
integrated into transboundary agreements. The teams could work under an already 
established commission, or a new commission could be created in support of the treaty. 
The same can be established for dispute resolution and the amendment process. For 
example, within the Colorado River Basin, amendments are made using “minutes” that 
must be approved by all the states (Cooley et al. 2009). The joint commission for the 
Colorado River Basin acts as the body that makes amendments to the treaty to account 
for changing hydrologic and social conditions. Ultimately, a flexible management 
structure is one the changes to respond to public need, basin priorities, new information, 
and water variability. 
The Treaty needs also needs to address water quality and pollution. While not 
much can be done to stop the pollution already done by climate change, measures can be 
taken to reduce the amount of anthropogenic pollution. Reducing pollution would require 
a creation of standard environmental regulations. These regulations would limit the 
amount infrastructure development (i.e. dams) that can be placed within the Indus Basin. 
While these dams often produce hydroelectricity, they are often damaging to the 
environment. These regulations can be created with the help of decision-making tools.  
Including Other Players 
 Another change that can be made to improve the Indus Waters Treaty is to include 
other bordering states. As mentioned earlier, the Treaty “does not call for management 
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for catchment areas that are located across the border and infiltrating toxic industrial 
waste” (Siddiqui 2015). China constitutes 8% of the total Indus River Basin (FAO 2015). 
However, “China is not party to any variability-related treaties and constitutes significant 
portions of these basins” (Stefano et al. 2012). It is necessary to include China as a party 
because the headwaters of the Indus and the Sutlej rivers originate in China in Western 
Tibet, and the total inflow from China into India is 181.62km3 (FAO 2015). China has 
access to the headwaters and has the ability to build harmful infrastructures like dams that 
contribute to the degradation of the river ways. The Indus Basin is interconnected. China 
is an upstream riparian and is able to pursue its interests with no consideration to the 
downstream effects of water flow. If China leaches pollution into the headwaters, that 
pollution will settle downstream into India and Pakistan. 
Fortunately, the South Asia Water Initiative has taken notice of this problem and 
has begun to facilitate cooperation with all states within the Indus River Basin. It is with 
this understanding that “government officials and academics from four South Asian 
countries that share the waters of the Indus (Afghanistan, China, India and Pakistan) 
undertook a joint study” (South Asia Water Initiative’s Glacial Monitoring Study n.d.) of 
the Glacial Retreat in the Tropical Andes Project. The goal was to learn about successful 
management projects and foster cooperation around managing mutual water resources. 
George Verghese from the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, a member of the 
delegation, said, “Joining hands and working together to manage our glaciers is the key to 
social and economic prosperity in the region” (South Asia Water Initiative’s Glacial 
Monitoring Study n.d.). It is in the best interest in the vitality of the waterways to include 
all the states with the Indus Basin in joint management because they are part of the 
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interconnected web of the Indus Basin. Responsibility should be based on the whole 
Indus rivers system, not just partially. Finally, since China is a neighbor to both India and 
Pakistan, it is also in China’s geostrategic interest to negotiate and develop a hydro-
political relationship with its neighbors. Although China is an economic powerhouse and 
can use its strength to have the upper hand (Ho 2015), careful negotiations can be made 
to convince China to use it economic strength to invest in environmental technologies in 
order to ensure river health for both itself and neighboring states.   
Decision-Making 
It would be beneficial if both countries abandoned the notion that water use and 
management should exist as independent rights of the state. Rather, the countries should 
think of water management as a joint responsibility. This would require the states to 
make mutually beneficial decisions. Mutually beneficial decisions can be made with the 
help of decision-making models and climate scientists. Climate scientists can produce 
reports called Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs). The Department of the 
Environment, UK defined EIA as, “A technique and process by which information about 
environmental effects of a project is collected, both by the developer and by other 
sources, and taken into account by the planning authority in forming the judgment on 
whether the development should proceed” (Fischer 2014). A large part of contention for 
India and Pakistan is the construction of hydropower dams, canals and water storage, 
which alter the use of the Indus Basin’s waterways. Having a team of scientists present an 
unbiased report like an EIA, combined with the information presented by engineers, can 
help the parties make clearly informed decisions. EIAs are a method of understanding the 
cost-benefit analysis of investing in engineered structures along the waterways. The Indus 
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Waters Treaty allows each state to develop, but requiring EIAs via treaty amendment will 
highlight the consequences and benefits of each project. It forces the parties to get into 
the mindset of acknowledging the consequences and encourages educated decisions. This 
is small step in the right direction of thinking about the Indus Basin as a whole system 
rather than ownership of individual rivers.   
Another route of decision-making is a Relevant Factors Matrix (RFM). The RFM 
“details the range of factors relevant to assessing a transboundary State’s entitlement to 
the uses of the waters of a transboundary watercourse (TIWC)” (Wouters 2013). It 
determines what is equitable and reasonable use of transboundary waterways. Each factor 
is weighed against each other and prioritized according to importance by the State. The 
factors are divided into 6 categories.  
• Category 1: (“What”) sets out the physical context of the waterway? 
• Category 2: (“Who”) details the population dependent on the waterway? 
• Category 3: (“What uses”) identifies the uses and economic demands? 
• Category 4: (“What impacts”) details the consequences of the uses? 
• Category 5: (“What options”) considers alternative uses and sources of 
water? 
• Category 6 is reserved for other relevant factors that may be necessary for 
decision-making (Wouters 2013).  
These decision-making models act as catalyst for integrated decision-making. 
They are comparative models that present the opportunity to perform a cost-benefit 
analysis. Additionally, they educate the states about possible consequences and provide 
an opportunity to discuss alternative options.  
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CHAPTER VII 
IMPROVING UPON THE INDUS COMMISSION 
Based on the preceding arguments, it is vital that the global community consider 
the importance of revisiting the Indus Waters Treaty. The threat of highly contentious 
social conflict combined with the reality of changing environmental conditions makes 
India and Pakistan vulnerable to resource conflict in the future. Additionally, as new 
issues emerge, new approaches to multilateral agreements may be necessary. However, 
efforts should be made to make these older agreements more coherent. One way to do 
this is to build upon already existing mechanisms. In the case of the Indus Waters Treaty, 
it already has a conflict resolution and commission mechanism in place. Building upon 
theses successful mechanisms can improve the resiliency and are easier to implement 
than creating new mechanisms.   
Establishing the Commission as a Method of Facilitation1 
The Indus Waters Treaty calls for mediation when disputes arise; but if the parties 
cannot come to an agreement, then the dispute is arbitrated by the Commission (Indus 
Waters Treaty 1960). But arbitration is costly and does not favor mutual success. 
Arbitration is usually a win-lose dynamic and a decision that favors one party over 
another can increase animosity between the groups. I do not deny that arbitration is an 
appropriate option for dispute resolution, but a situation like what exists between India 
and Pakistan may require something more to foster a working relationship. The first step 
towards this goal is for each party to participate in open and informed dialogue by any 
means available.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Facilitation and other conflict resolution practices are only possible if both parties agree to participate in 
the process. The following paragraphs are written as if both India and Pakistan have agreed to participate.  
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Commission Members as Facilitators 
While mediation is a sufficient way to resolve conflict, it is not as robust as 
facilitation. For example, “In mediation, the goal is to get to an agreement. In facilitation, 
it is to assist a group in accomplishing the content of their work” (Fleischer & Zumeta 
1999). Facilitation is most closely associated with problem solving in public policy, but it 
can be applied to other cases. For example, the benefit of using facilitation in the case of 
renegotiation the Indus Waters Treaty is that it not only can help mitigate specific 
problems associated with climate change, but it can also help develop a framework for 
solving future problems. For example, facilitation can help the parties re-divide the 
waterways so that they are shared more evenly. Additionally, it can help develop criteria 
for how to assess and solve problems that arise in the future by creating a “plan of 
implementation” (Fleischer & Zumeta 1999). 
 It would be beneficial if the Commission was adapted to act more as facilitators 
in order to create informed dialogue and consensus building. Thus, the Commission 
would undertake projects of “future cooperation” (Ahmad 2011). For example, a 
facilitator would consult with each party to help them utilize the water judiciously in 
order to prevent conflict. They would also help the parties create a plan for the future 
considering the effects of climate change. Mediation, on the other hand, would be called 
in to mediate water disputes once climate change has altered the conditions of the 
waterways. Facilitation can more easily be modified to be proactive while mediation is 
more prescriptive.  
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Commission Members as Experts 
If the Commission were to change roles, the Commission would be a joint body 
and “may be formed either independently or within the ambit of the Permanent Indus 
Commission, to work out modalities and scope of joint cooperation” (Ahmad 2011). The 
body may be composed of “apolitical or technical experts” and “tasked to find avenues 
for mutual cooperation” (Ahmad 2011). The benefit of having apolitical or technical 
experts is that they are neutral and do not represent a certain party. They exist to provide 
technical expertise, information, and consultations.  
The Commission, as is stated in the Indus Water Treaty, appoints engineers in 
hydrology and water use to help the parties make more sound decisions. However, “there 
is a need to strengthen the capacity of the Commission and its staff” (Siddiqui 2015). 
This could be done through the inclusion of third sources like “NASA scientists, Institute 
of Oceanography, and Chinese experts having scientific competence on such issues” 
(Siddiqui 2015). The benefit of a Commission is that they can play a variety of roles. 
They can establish flood management teams, oversee an amendment process, and provide 
expertise as described earlier. In addition to the experts already mentioned, it is necessary 
that the Commission include climate change experts. In 2010, the International 
Commission for the Protection of the Rhine developed a basin-wide adaptation plan with 
help from their climate change expert group (Cooley et al. 2009). The team helped 
facilitate a shared understanding of the possible consequences of climate change and 
develop a mitigation plan. Including climate scientists on the Commission provides the 
catalysts for change within the Treaty. They provide immediate access to education and 
can help develop mitigation options that fit within the framework of the Treaty.  
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Commission Members as Interpreters and Decision Makers 
I believe that it should be the responsibility of the Commission to follow the legal 
principle of “equitable and reasonable use” as presented in Article 5 of the 1997 UN 
Watercourses Convention (UNWC) (Wouters 2013). As stated in Indus Waters Treaty, 
the purpose of the Commission is to provide communication and interpret the Treaty. 
However, since the Treaty was adopted in 1960, the UNWC has presented new 
procedural rules such as the principle presented above. Because these rules formed post-
Indus Treaty, the Commission does not have to abide by the UNWC. However, it would 
be beneficial to apply Article 5 because this rule focuses on the use of waters rather than 
the apportionment of water. All factors when evaluating equitable and reasonable use are 
to be considered on the basis of the whole which follows the International Law 
Association Helsinki Rules, “thus all relevant social, environmental, economic, and 
hydrographic factors are to be identified, given due weight, and evaluated together” 
(Wouters 2013). When a “conflict-of-use” arises, “vital human needs” and “vital 
environmental needs” shall be afforded first and second priority (Wouters 2013). The 
Commission should transform its body to prescribe to the modern regulations if it wants 
to protect the future of the Indus Basin.  
Finally, one of the benefits of having the Commission act as facilitators is that the 
agreements are non-binding and do not undermine the authority of the Indus Waters 
Treaty. Facilitation is a self-motivated process so it only works if both parties are willing 
to cooperate. Thus, if India and Pakistan both agree to participate in facilitation in good 
faith then it is possible that they could create a resolution that both parties are happy with. 
However, any agreement (even if it was consensual) is not the end-all-be-all. Each party 
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still maintains their rights and authorities that the Indus Waters Treaty grants them. This 
is highly favorable to parties as it often reassures them that facilitation is not an 
adjudication process. It may be that India and Pakistan resort to resolving their 
differences with the Treaty, but facilitation gives them the possibility for a more 
favorable outcome. Facilitation provides an open forum for dialogue and encourages the 
sharing of information. Additionally, it provides a space to solve existing disputes but to 
also establish plans for the future.  
Examples of Successful Facilitations 
 A benefit of facilitation is that it makes communication between parties easier. 
Facilitators help the parties communicate respectively and provide the framework for 
discourse and building amicable relationships. Additionally, facilitation focuses on areas 
of mutual interest to help find common ground. It attacks problem solving by 
encouraging mutual benefits, creativity, and educated decisions. Facilitation is also 
flexible. It can focus on very specific issues or it can be expanded to include a broad 
scope of issues. Finally, facilitation is a method of dispute resolution that focuses on 
collaboration and consensus building (Spangler 2003). By modifying the Commission to 
prescribe to a facilitative process, the Commission acts in good faith, provides a well-
rounded education, and acts for the good of the whole. The following case studies 
exemplify the importance and success of applying facilitative tactics.  
Case Study example: Zambezi River in Africa 
 About 30 million people live in the Zambezi River Basin as it is shared by 8 
countries including: Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, 
and Mozambique. Zambia and Zimbabwe created the Zambezi River Authority (ZRA) in 
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1987. The ZRA was comprised to act as the body responsibly for managing Kariba dam. 
The Zambezi River is also covered by legal framework under the SADC Revised 
Protocol. “The SADC Revised Protocol promotes a basin-wide approach to water 
management, encouraging ‘close cooperation for judicious, sustainable, and coordinated 
utilisation [sic] or the resources of the shared watercourses’” (Wouters 2013).  
Recognizing the importance of protecting the waterways, 7 out of the 8 countries in the 
Zambezi River Basin signed the Agreement on the Establishment of the Zambezi 
Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM Agreement). According to the ZAMCOM 
Agreement, the Commission applies facilitative practices by “provid[ing] a platform for 
on-going discussions and negotiations on issues relevant to the management of the 
Zambezi, including flood mitigation, climate change adaptation, joint infrastructure 
development and management, and environmental protection” (Wouters 2013). Even 
though Zambia is reluctant to ratify the ZAMCOM Agreement, all the countries continue 
to cooperate on an informal basis (Wouters 2013).  
The message to take away from this case study is that mutual interest can 
encourage cooperation. Zambia is hesitant to ratify the Agreement but still works to 
cooperate based on the mutual interest of building infrastructure and providing flood 
control. Establishing a Commission like the aforementioned encourages communication 
and education both pre and post-conflict. ZAMCOM provides the platform to 
communicate both parties’ concerns and recognize their mutual interests. Additionally, 
ZAMCOM is established in such a way that it encourages forward thinking. The current 
Indus Commission meets every year to discuss, usually, proposed dam and hydroelectric 
projects. However, these infrastructure developments are usually spearheaded by only 
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one state. Because the Indus Waters Treaty grants each country exclusive use of the 
waters its own territory, conflict often arises when the other country expects the 
consequences of a project to affect their waterways. For example, the 109th Commission 
meeting discussed India’s proposed projects on the Chenab River in which Pakistan 
questioned the design in regards to spillway, pondage, and water intake (Pakistan’s Indus 
Waters Commission Visited India 2013). By following in the footsteps of ZAMCOM, the 
Indus Commission can be encouraged to discuss joint, rather than independent, 
infrastructure development. This can encourage the countries to think about water as a 
shared resource rather than a partitioned resource as it is presented in the Indus Waters 
Treaty.  
Case Study example: Niger River in West Africa 
 The Niger River is the largest waterway in West Africa. It passes through 4 
countries (Guinea, Mali, Benin, and Niger) and its tributaries extend into Burkina, Faso, 
the Ivory Coast, and Cameroon (Wouters 2013).  
 In 1963, the Niger River Commission (NRC) was established in conjunction with 
the 1963 Act of Niamey. Later, the 1964 Agreement was created to complement the 1963 
Act. The 1964 Agreement agreed to monitor and coordinate navigation activities along 
the river. However, the Niger Basin Authority (NBA) replaced the NRC during the 1980 
Convention in response to amendments made to the 1964 Agreement. The NBA 
established a broader mandate. Its task is to “promote cooperation between the member 
States and to ensure an integrated development on the Niger Basin in all fields through 
the harnessing of its resources” (Wouters 2013). Its functions to regulate water levels, 
establish flood control, prevent droughts, and protect and preserve the environment is 
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implemented through the NBA mandate rather than through provisions contained in the 
1980 Convention. The 1980 Convention was later replaced with the Revised Convention 
on the Niger Basin Authority of 1987 (Wouters 2013).  
 There have been numerous modifications since the original treaty in 1963. The 
Niger States adopted the Paris Declaration in 2004 for developing and implementing a 
Shared Vision, which included a Development and Strategic Action plan, Investment 
Programme, and a Niger River Basin Water Charter. Then in 2011, the Niger basin States 
adopted the Bamako Declaration, which featured facilitative practices like collaboration 
and flexibility. It contained a “set or recommendations aimed at improving and 
strengthening inter-State water-related collaboration” (Wouters 2013). As needs changed 
with the Niger Basin so did its legal regime. It has been continuously evolving for the 
past 50 years. The NBA has also recently been called to become even more 
comprehensive in response to climate change impacts (Wouters 2013). The Niger River 
is a great example to follow because it illustrates that an evolving regime is possible. It 
highlights my assertion that modifications and amendments to treaties can be successful.  
Case Study example: Mekong River in Southeast Asia 
 Water governance in the Mekong River highlights the connections between the 
impacts of decisions and multi-stakeholder interests. The river winds its way through 
Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and China’s Yunnan Province and 
supports about 260 million people. Water governance in the Mekong River is particularly 
challenging due to “the complexity of societies, economies and ecologies” (Dore et al. 
2012). Water resources are used to support agriculture, energy, irrigation, and supply 
water to thirsty communities but “spatial differences in wealth, job opportunities, 
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resource endowments, environmental degradation, business regulation, law enforcement, 
and political freedom” result in complex challenges and add pressure to natural resources 
(Dore et al. 2012). However, changes in demographics, needs, and concerns drive a 
change in water governance discourse.  
 In 1995, the Mekong River Agreement was established. It mandates inter-
governmental management for the mainstream, tributaries, and lands of the basin within 
the Mekong River territories. Article 1 of the Agreement “commits the four member 
countries to cooperate in all fields of sustainable development, utilisation, management 
and conservation of the Mekong River Basin in all fields such as irrigation, hydropower, 
navigation flood control and fisheries” (Dore et al. 2012). Discourse is a large part of 
water governance in this region because it provides a framework for narratives, 
intentions, and discussions. Discourse has also supported communication in different 
arenas of political and decision-making power. It recognizes spatial scales like “domains 
of administration, hydrology, economy and ecosystem” (Dore et al. 2012) and the levels 
of interests. As a result, the actors participating in the discourse understand the multi-
dimensional framework of water governance.  
 The lesson to take away from water governance in the Mekong River is the 
opportunity to facilitate platforms of communication. The stakeholders are as diverse as 
their interests but the platform for public deliberation is improving; and “improvements 
in Mekong River Commission forums is resulting in more participatory analyses of 
project merits” (Dore et al. 2012). Decision-making can be improved by encouraging 
discourse and the participation of varying perspectives. The benefit of having multi-
stakeholder platforms is that it provides the opportunity to explore alternative 
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developments and assess the impacts. Additionally, discourse builds trust and cooperation 
for actors to work together.  
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CHAPTER VII 
REALITY CHECKING AND CONCLUSION 
A Good Foundation 
Geoffrey Dalbelko presents the idea that environmental conflict can facilitate 
interstate cooperation. The UN Environmental Programme’s Post-Conflict and Disaster 
Management Branch (PCDMB) has begun a program called “environmental diplomacy” 
which capitalizes on cooperation in times of conflict. The cooperation spurred by 
environmental conflicts can be “use[d] as the basis for confidence building rather than 
merely engendering conflict” (Dabelko 2015). Instead of countries gearing up towards 
war in times of scarcity, programs like these encourage environmental peacemaking 
(Dabelko 2015). The United Nations Environment Programme explains that 
environmental conflict can be a peacebuilding tool through the opportunity for dialogue 
and confidence building. 
Feasibility 
But is this new framework for agreements even possible between India and 
Pakistan given their history of non-cooperation? I admit that my enquiry is problematic. 
The problem is that the resolutions mentioned can only be feasible if both parties agree to 
incorporate them. These ideas cannot become a reality if one party refuses to participate. 
Unfortunately, it is possible that one or both of the parties may refuse to change because 
the risk is large. For example, water availability can be used as leverage in water scarce 
countries. A change in water supply can mean a change in security. A state may feel 
threatened if it has to share water proportionately because this eliminates the possibility 
of one state having more water, and thus more power (Homer-Dixon 1999). Additionally, 
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a state may prefer to keep the Indus Waters Treaty as it exists because it provides a 
freedom to develop infrastructure; where if they have to cooperative, then the 
development of new infrastructure may suffer. Finally, the uncertainty of the future state 
of the waterways may be intimidating. The effects of climate change are not certain so 
the success of the steps taken to adapt to climate change cannot be certain. The 
Commission may also feel hesitant about undertaking new responsibilities. A proactive 
approach is daunting and the parties may feel more comfortable remaining prescriptive.  
However, I argue that change is possible because these suggested resolutions 
work within the framework of the Indus Waters Treaty, not against it. The benefit of 
transforming the Commission into facilitators is that it does not exempt the Commission 
of its original dispute resolution duties. It merely extends the responsibility of the 
Commission. That being said, it seems liked that both parties would have an easier time 
agreeing to adapt the scope of responsibility of the Commission than to agree to dissolve 
the entirety of the Indus Waters Treaty or re-allocation of the waters. Additionally, 
changing the standards for the Commission also does not discredit the Treaty. The rights 
as stated in the Treaty are still enforceable. For example, India will still have the right to 
the rivers allocated to it and Pakistan will still have the right to its allocated rivers (Indus 
Waters Treaty 1960). This can be presented as a reassuring incentive.  
We also have a better understanding of how important it is to take care of the 
environment. The idea of environmental sustainability has gained popularity over the 
years due to the growth of environmental education in western countries. Now, other 
countries are investing in the future and taking the measures to ensure a healthy 
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environment for future generations. The momentum of environmentalism can slingshot 
forward the idea of renegotiating the Indus Waters Treaty to adapt to climate change. 
Finally, integrated water resource management and climate change adaptation 
have gained popularity on the international policy agenda; including the UN Roundtable 
on Water Security, the World Economic Forum, and the UNECE Water Convention 
Meeting of the Parties (Wouters 2013). The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) reports “the need for improved governance and policy coherence” 
(Wouters 2013) for water reform. The reality of cooperation relies on effective 
governance and well-functioning institutions. Without it, these reforms are prone to 
social and economic corruption. The Director General of the World Trade Organisation 
echoed this sentiment emphasizing that “global governance must be anchored in laws and 
regulations accompanied by mechanisms for their enforcement” (Wouters 2013). This 
call for increased enforcement and support from international water law warrants an 
exploration of the concept of obligations erga omnes, the duty of the States to cooperate 
on peaceful management (Wouters 2013). It not only warrants a legal focus but also a 
global community focus to manage environmental resources.  
Conclusion This	  Indus	  Waters	  Treaty	  has	  been	  a	  sufficient	  agreement	  to	  the	  water	  resource	  conflict	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  in	  the	  past,	  but	  changing	  conditions	  are	  likely	  to	  challenge	  its	  success	  in	  the	  future.	  It	  has	  endured	  despite	  poor	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  countries;	  but	  it	  fails	  to	  consider	  problems	  associated	  with	  upstream-­‐downstream	  problems,	  pollution,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  climate	  change.	  It	  is	  necessary	  that	  the	  Treaty	  is	  re-­‐examined	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  authority	  and	  to	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sustain	  the	  health	  of	  the	  Indus	  Basin	  waterways.	  Climate	  change	  mitigation	  needs	  to	  have	  higher	  priority	  because	  climate	  change	  is	  likely	  to	  alter	  the	  flow	  and	  quality	  of	  water,	  which	  would	  create	  resource	  scarcity.	  Climate	  change	  consequences	  and	  the	  heavy	  dependence	  on	  water	  will	  affect	  the	  environmental,	  social,	  and	  economic	  systems	  within	  the	  countries;	  and	  these	  effects	  are	  often	  exacerbated	  in	  countries	  that	  have	  a	  history	  of	  social	  and	  political	  conflict.	  Given	  this	  information,	  I	  offer	  suggestions	  on	  how	  to	  improve	  the	  Indus	  Waters	  Treaty.	  The	  foundations	  of	  these	  improvements	  rely	  on	  cooperation,	  communication	  and	  education.	  The	  best	  way	  to	  implement	  these	  goals	  is	  through	  a	  change	  in	  the	  Commission’s	  responsibility	  and	  changing	  the	  scope	  of	  existing	  agreements.	  The	  case	  studies	  presented	  encourage	  the	  necessity	  for	  change. 
My hope, if the countries do agree to extend the scope of responsibility of the 
Commission, is that the Commission will provide an increase in expert information to 
allow the parties to make more informed, well-rounded decisions. By understanding the 
gravity and consequences that their decisions hold, India and Pakistan can shift to making 
mutually beneficial decisions. This process is a small step in the larger goal of thinking 
about the Indus Basin as interconnected; that the waterways should be considered shared 
rather than partitioned. As I said, these changes would not affect the authority of the 
Indus Waters Treaty. The changes made to the Commission can be compared to the 
changes made to a co-parenting agreement. If the parties cannot agree, then the original 
parenting plan will be the default. Similarly, if India and Pakistan cannot agree to 
mutually beneficial decisions, than each country has the right to default to their rights as 
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stated in the Treaty. However, the future health of the Indus Basin requires a change of 
this mindset and I hope that the case studies presented can encourage the evolution.  
Even if these resolutions seem impossible upon further examination, I hope that it 
has sparked a discussion for championing different avenues of conflict resolution. Even 
engaging in a thought experiment such as this is a step in the right direction because it 
opens up a forum to creative problem solving. A more peaceful world is possible but it 
relies on global-level change. There needs to be a shift in the political and legal mindset 
of cooperation being a public duty. I also hope that the readers understand the impact 
climate change will have on transboundary agreements and that they have gained an 
understanding of the importance of having treaties that respond to climate change. I 
encourage the readers to be critical of existing treaties and question their sustainability.  
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